'A club perpetually poised on the brink of crisis'

 For various reasons it has taken me some time to carefully read Michael Appleton's double page interview in Sunday's Football League Paper.  We all know from Gobby's days as manager that there is a difference between talking the talk and walking the walk.

Nevertheless, Appleton talks frankly and what he has to say shows realism and make sense.   He admits that he has made mistakes, but he is tried to learn from them.  There is something to be said for experience even if the record is mixed which is perhaps unavoidable in the lower leagues.

The FLP is rightly critical of our recent troubles:

• 'The Addicks have churned through owners and managers at a prodigious rate in recent years and appear a club perpetually poised on a brink if crisis'
• 'A youthful side - that for all its potential - looks desperately raw'
• 'Charlton have now changed manager mid-season for a fourth successive season'

Appleton says that he wants to take the club back into the Championship 'and then to be competitive there.  But for us to do that, there's a lot of work that needs to be done.  A hell of a lot.   There's stuff that needs to be sorted out and rectified before you can even think of promotion.'

'Yes, the club's got great tradition.  It's a very, very big fanbase, especially when you give them something to shout about.  But, for me, the potential of these players to improve - and fast - that was the big attraction.'

'I want to improve the intensity in the way in which we play.  That's not just out of possession, going round kicking people and getting in people's faces.  It's how we move the ball.  I want to see this team press the ball forward much more than it has done.  If you look at my previous teams, that doesn't mean going gung-ho or playing 50- and 60-yard passes straight to the striker.'

'Be positive.  Try things.  And if you make mistakes, makes sure they're positive mistakes. Don't give the ball away because you've been tentative or unsure.  Give it away because you tried to do something progressive.'

'League One is as open as it's been for a long, long time. In previous seasons there have been three or four really big clubs who've had the budgets and squads to cope with 46 games a lot better than most teams at this level.'

Appleton seems to realise that his tenure may be limited: 'If I can be the person who starts that fightback, it's not a bad legacy is it?'

Rapid managerial turnover is no panacea

Short termism is a British disease, but it is particularly acute in football.   It is driven by an over active stock market, now reinforced by the activities of hedge funds and private equity companies.  Short termism is not the only reason the UK has a chronic productivity problem. but it is certainly part of the picture.

I was struck by the following comment in the Financial Times yesterday about the success of Aldi and Lidl: 'Being private allows Aldi and Lidl to keep prying eyes at bay and not be held to ransom by shareholders if they do not meet their sales or profit forecasts.;

The chief executive of Aldi for the UK and Ireland said 'this is an absolutely tremendous strength of our business.  It means we can make very long-term decisions even when the road is bumpy.'

It's a different story in football and especially at Charlton these days.   The following edited extract from my book Political Football is relevant:

'Expectations in society generally of private or public services have increased, but this is particularly acute in the case of football where there is an immediate measure of success or failure in terms of results and tables. “It’s a results business” is one of the most familiar clichés used in relation to the game,

There has been an increase in managerial turnover. In the ten years to 31 December 2019, “103 different men have been in charge of Premier League clubs in the last 10 years, holding 153 posts between them” (Ridge 2019). Lower-league clubs are also unforgiving of managers that are perceived to be underperforming. There is often a brief improvement in performance after a manager is replaced. However, “eventually results regress to the mean” (Kuper & Szymanski 2012).

A manager’s success may well be affected by luck, such as refereeing decisions or injuries to key players. This, however, does not excuse what has often been a lack of professionalism in the recruitment process. Simon Kuper notes that in hiring managers, as a rule “research is usually hasty. A club owner rings a man’s mobile and offers him the job, typically days after sacking the previous incumbent” (Kuper 2020).

The process of recruitment is slowly becoming more professional. Jürgen Klopp was the subject of a 60-page report by Fenway Sports Group, and he was then interviewed for several hours at a New York law firm before his appointment at Liverpool. However, the Covid-19 pandemic may change the emphasis on external recruitment. Less well-financed clubs “will tend to give top jobs to internal hires with briefs to sell players and develop cheap youngsters” (Kuper 2020a).

The manager may not be as key a factor as some popular discussions of football assume, but that does not mean that they have no impact at all on performance. Examining data on managers that have been in charge for 30 games or more, which would tend to exclude the worst-performing managers, Szymanski (working with Thomas Peeters) found that about 20 per cent of a population of over 1,000 managers had a positive impact on their club that was statistically significant.

Any fan could produce a list of managers they considered to be outstanding and this is consistent with the finding that “most managers made little difference, while a few have a significant impact” (Szymanski 2015). There are exceptional managers, but there are fewer of them than is generally supposed which helps to explain why there is so much disappointment with the performance of managers. This is magnified by the perception of the manager as “some kind of dream maker, who ‘gives hope’ to fans” (Carter 2006).  [Carter writes extensively about Charlton and Jimmy Seed in particular].

Disposing of a manager can be expensive. Chelsea paid out £96 million in compensation to departing managers and their staffs in the 15 years to 2019. It cost Chelsea £23.1 million to sack the “special one” in 2007/8 and £8.3 million in 2015/16. It cost Manchester United £19.6 million to sack him in 2018/19. That’s a total bill of £51 million.    [Even at Charlton there is compensation to be paid].

'Experienced' manager takes the reins

As anticipated by the bookmakers, Michael Appleton has been appointed the new head coach at Charlton.  He took training this morning.

Appleton has been round the lower leagues and, inevitably, has a connection with Oxford United.  He tends to have relatively short tenures in managerial or coaching roles, but that fits with the new Charlton way: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Appleton

I don't see that he is a great advance on Dean Holden and the materials he will have to work with remain limited.  At least we are doing our bit to reduce unemployment in football as he has been out of work for eight months.

Of course, I wish him well and hope that he proves me wrong.  I am generally a glass half full person, but I have rarely been so ;pessimistic about the state of the club.   Perhaps things can only get better.

BTW, Lee Bowyer is now coaching Montserrat.

What went wrong, Part 6, and the future

The ESI episode was so bizarre but also so worrying that it is difficult to sum it up.   Best just to refer back to the court hearing.  This account gives a sense of the confusion: https://addicksdiary3.blogspot.com/2020/09/our-day-in-court.html

The Sandgaard period is very fresh in our memories.  I think that he was well intentioned but naive, a typical example of a businessman successful in another field thinking he can sort out the much more challenging and uncertain world of football.  He under estimated how much getting promoted would cost and, like Roland, involved some unsuitable people in running the club, not least his son.  I am more tolerant than some of his egotistical guitar playing antics.  If you are going to put millions into a loss making business, you are entitled to a bit of fun.

I find it difficult to work out what the strategy of the fragmented present ownership is.  If they want to make money out of Charlton, they should get the club promoted to the Championship and then sell it on as a potential Premier League club.   That requires much more investment than has been forthcoming.

Indeed, apart from Alfie May, it's the old story: use Academy players while they are still developing and see what we can pick up at the end of the transfer window on the cheap or as loan signings.  We were very fortunate with Rak Sakyi last year.

I can only suggest that you follow Drinking During the Game on this topic,  Like Dave, I am sceptical about Charlie Methven whom I think is a slippery customer.  VOTV website editor Rick Everitt has been surprisingly silent on the topic: usually he is first in the queue to denounce a new owner.  However, he may be weighed down by his civic duties.

In my view there were two crucial turning points in our history.   First, and most crucially, the failure to back Jimmy Seed when he wanted to make Charlton the Arsenal of South London by developing The Valley and making marquee signings.  Second, the mess made of the Alan Curbishley succession.  He should have been allowed to stay on for a final year while potential successors were researched.  Instead we got Dowie and his all purpose PowerPoint.

What future for Charlton?

'Charlton till I die' has more meaning for some of us and I am unlikely to see the end of this saga, but it may not be a happy one.  Charlton had the third biggest loss in League One in the last accounting period and has one of the biggest debts (£20m).  The ground and the training ground are owned by Roland who is said to want an excessive £50m for them.

So here are three scenarios with probabilities attached:

1. Charlton get promoted to the Championship and are bought by a seriously rich individual who is prepared to spend to get the club in the Premier League.  20 per cent.

2. Charlton muddle through as a mid-table League One club (perhaps including one season in League Two).  40 per cent.

3. Charlton fall into the National League, the club is no longer viable or sustainable.  Fans form AFC Charlton using a Kent non-ground and entering Step 6 of the non-league pyramid.

That's my last post for a while, unless there is some major development at the club.

What went wrong, part 5

Some Charlton fans think that the Roland era was much better than what followed or went before, although it's not a competitive league.   Steve Sutherland thinks that Charlton fans will rue amtagonising Rolamd and he does still own the stadium and the training ground.

Roland's idea of a network of European clubs was not in principle a bad one and Manchester City have produced a more sophisticated version on a global basis: https://footballeconomyv2.blogspot.com/2019/11/share-sale-puts-high-value-on.html   Indeed, Chelsea have now said they will follow suit.

However, it all went wrong for Roland when he lost the mother ship, Standard Liege, after fans there got fed up with him.  All the other clubs in the network apart from Charlton were third rate at best.

So let's look at the charge sheet against Roland.  He appointed as chief executive a lawyer with no previous experience of football who made errors in negotiating contracts.  She introduced gimmicks like the fan sofa, eventually destroyed by fans.  Nevertheless, she subsequently commanded an annual salary estimated to be £137,000 in a similar position at Sheffield Wednesday.

The really big puzzle is why she made no use of her knowledge of competition law.  Roland believed that his financial model would work because there was bound to be a levelling of the playing field in English football, certainly in the EFL.  Katrien Meire should have told him that any such move would have been open to challenge in the courts umder both domestic and EU competition law.   The Premier League had already had its fingers burnt in a face off with the European Commission in 2006.

One of Roland's first acts was to sell off Yann Kermorgant.   He then foisted on us a series of incompetent players from the continent, advised by someone with a laptop and no football background.   When Chris Powell got us promoted, he failed to back him with sufficient funds.  We then had a rapid succession of managers largely in the range barely adequate to useless.

One of the most effective critques of Roland's stewardship ws provided by Millwall fan Rod Liddle: https://addicksdiary3.blogspot.com/search?q=Liddle+gives+it+large

The barmy Belgian had a great opportunity, but he ended up doing us a lot of harm.

What went wrong, part 4

Producing this narrative has taken longer than I intended, but I have been afflicted by health challenges.  Indeed, the NHS came to my rescue on Saturday with prompt and decisive action, telling me that I had 'dodged a bullet'.

A persistent belief of some Charlton fans is that prospective purchasers of the club are interested in a property play, although, of course, Roland currently owns The Valley and the training ground.  The Valley is a very awkward site for development and it is in South London not North London.   Watching University Challenge last night, I was struck by how many contestants representing UCL and King's Cambridge were from North London.

Conversion or demolition of The Valley would be expensive.  However, the biggest problem is the constrained access which would make planning permission difficult to secure, plus the steep slope on part of the site.

Nevertheless, one group of owners, sometimes referred to in some quarters as 'the spivs' (shurely visionary entrepreneurs, ed) were backed by sufficient cash to contemplate building a soulless functional replacement stadium near the O2.

Read here about the secret plan to leave The Valley: https://www.votvonline.com/home/the-2017-18-blogs/22-12-how-jimenez-schemed-to-leave-the-valley/

There were furher relevations in a court case: https://www.theguardian.com/football/2018/feb/09/charlton-khakshouri-jimenez-cash-modern-football

In summary, 'a man called Darius Khakshouri was awarded $4m in damages at the Royal Courts of Justice. In Court 9, Mr Justice Green found in favour of Khakshouri and against Tony Jimenez and Kevin Cash after the property developer claimed he had been deceived by the pair over a loan. That loan was of £1.8m, made in the autumn of 2013, in a last-minute bid to keep Charlton Athletic in business

Cash's  business operations based offshore and split between trusts and holding companies. A similarly nebulous structure was found to lie behind Charlton’s ownership during Jimenez’s and Cash’s involvement at the club. In his ruling, Justice Green found that neither Jimenez nor Cash actually owned Charlton, another reason why their representations to Khakshouri had been deceitful.'

In 2019 the Court of Appeal ruled that Jiminez would have to reveal details of his tax affairs: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-47075503

Charlton does seem to be attractive to entrepreneurs who fall below the highest standards of propriety.

What went wrong, Part 2 - the Roland years

 n order to understand the Roland years, it is necessary to think about his mentality and what he was trying to achieve.  It wasn't necessarily bonkers, it was poorly designed and executed.  Steve Sutherland thinks that the biggest mistake made by Charlton fans was antagonizing Roland.   I don't agree, but I see where he is coming from.

We need some context and I have to give some personal background.   When I queued for tickets for the Greatest Game, I had to then go to Waterloo to catch a Eurostar to Brussels.  Between the mid 1990s and the late noughties, I was back and forth on Eurostar endlessly, having attended meetings in windowless rooms in Brussels.   In those days it trundled through Kent and it was always heartening to pass somewhere known for Addicktion such as Swanley or Bromley.

In the mid 1990s I was rung up out of the blue by the Cabinet Office and asked if I would represent the UK on a minor European Commission committee.  In time the EU asked me with a few weeks notice to lead a major research project while I was seconded to a UK government department to advise on EU policy,.

I was also sent to represent the EU at a conference in a remote part of China which had more ethnic minorities than Han Chinese.  I was presented with a plate of fried wasps as a great delicacy: fortunately my driver ate them.

Imagine my surprise when I switched on the television and there was a very informative feature on how Curbs and Keith Peacock worked together!

The local television station asked to interview me.  I had a minder from the EU's Beijing office and was ready with a few platitudes about pandas.  To my surprise, they had done their homework and started questioning me about levels of air pollution in Greenwich.

What has all this got to do with Roland and football?   Before the financial crisis the Commission took a great interest in football.  The key figure here was Viviane Reding from Luxembourg who was a commissioner from 1999 to 2014, initially with responsibility for sport and ultimately as a vice-president.   Like many politicians from Luxembourg, she punched about her country's weight in the EU.  I only heard her speak once (in the Grand Duchy) and she hardly set the room alight.

Reding and the Commission had a run in with the Premier League over breaches of cartel law.   Tony Blair got involved and in the end the concessions the Premier League had to make were not that onerous.  (I have written on this elsewhere).

Above all, the Commission saw football as a potential integrating force that could help to develop a European identity.   I am not suggesting that Roland talked to the Commission, but he was 'dans le vent' and could see the way the wind was blowing.   Remember that at one time he tried to set up his own political party.   More follows in the next instalment.